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EXPANDING COPYRIGHTS IN SOFTWARE:
THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
"EXPRESSION" BEGINS
Paul R. Lamoree*
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer software is most likely the variety of intellectual
property least understood by laymen and judges. It is at the same
time the variety for which the legal rules are least developed and
the variety capable of having the greatest economic impact in the
era of "competitiveness." Congress chose in the Computer
Software Copyright Act of 1980, at the largely unexamined recom-
mendation of an industry committee,' to effect protection and en-
couragement of software by very minor amendments to the
Copyright Act.2
The copyright area itself is characterized by concepts and cate-
gories foreign both to ordinary common sense and to the language
of the computer industry, and by a limited base of carefully elabo-
rated judicial decisions.
It is the purpose of this article to offer a perspective on innova-
tive judicial efforts to deal with software by relating certain aspects
of programming to the corollary elements of literary creation. It
argues that from this perspective, two recent and potentially semi-
nal judicial decisions in cases of partial copying, one purporting to
follow the other, are in fact wholly irreconcilable, and that the two,
respectively, tend to arrive at altogether different outcomes for the
struggle. It further observes that a third current decision poses a
conflict in the circuits on the fundamental question of whether
copyright can protect against anything more subtle than mechanical
"line-by-line" copying of the entire program.
In particular, this article examines those decisions in light of an
* Paul R. Lamoree is a litigation partner with Watson, Ess, Marshall and Engass in
Kansas City, Missouri. His substantive specialty is intellectual property. L.L.B. Yale Law
School, 1967; B.S. Yale College, 1964. All rights reserved.
1. The 1978 Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works, (CONTU), established by Congress in H.R. Rep. No. 573, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6849, 6855.
2. The CONTU recommendations were enacted by H.R. Rep. No. 1307, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6460, 6482, 6506 (1982).
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earlier effort to address the problems with an eye to predicting what
aspects of a program can and should be protected against
appropriation.
II. THE COPYRIGHT MODEL
Under the Act, one secures copyright protection for a program
simply by writing it; preserves it merely by affixing a notice of copy-
right if it is "published;" and might register it by filing copies of a
small fragment of the "source code listing" embodying the logic and
mechanisms of the program with the Register of Copyrights. Rep-
resentations of screen images may also be filed as audiovisual works
or as literary compilations.
A certificate of copyright issues routinely for a computer pro-
gram, just as it does for a book or photograph, without anyone hav-
ing "read" the materials fied, much less having given consideration
to what rights are being conferred.
There is no built-in process to guide the courts comparable to
the administratively negotiated description of the allowed claims of
letters patent.3 Even when disputes later arise and the copies of the
"listing" are tendered as evidence of the content of the copyrighted
work, the filings provide no more than obscure grist for expert testi-
mony. No flow charts or other documentation explaining the pro-
gram's use, purposes, or the means by which the cryptic source
code implements the purpose need accompany the partial code
sheets. Consequently, the question of what it is that the copyright
holder owns is left for subsequent judicial determination.
Publicly sold versions of the program ordinarily contain only
"object code" - a compilation of O's and l's which is readable only
by the machine. What was originally written, called "source code,"
is rarely published.4 A subsequent author's determinations of what
is proprietary to another must be made within the traditional copy-
right law categories of "copying," "adaptation," "access" and "sub-
stantial similarity," but without the ordinary benefit of being able to
review the prior work in its entirety to extract the sense of the work
in the medium in which it was originally authored. In most juris-
dictions electing the copyright model for protection also leaves the
determination of whether one program infringes the rights of the
owner of another to the standard of an ordinary, reasonable person.
3. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-114, 131-135 (1982); 37 C.F.R. § 1.101 etseq. (1986).
4. See E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1487-88 (D.
Minn. 1985); SAS Institute, Inc. v. S&H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 820.21
(M.D. Tenn. 1985).
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In traditional areas of copyright, such "reasonable persons" have
risen to the occasion in determining whether "My Sweet Lord" in-
fringes "Oh Happy Day," whether Captain Marvel comics infringe
Superman comics, and whether the characters in the McDonald-
land TV commercials infringe those in the H. R. Puf'n'Stuf chil-
dren's show. The ear and eye may suffice in such contexts, although
jurors know little of music theory or artists' techniques.
Whether two computer programs are substantially similar
presents rather more subtle questions. Similarity in how they ap-
pear to work can be highly misleading, whether the appearance is
judged from watching the screen displays and reviewing the
printouts or by extrapolating from the verbal instructions in the
user's manuals. For example, any spreadsheet program does pretty
much the same functions as any other, although some have addi-
tional features. All produce columnar screen displays and printouts
in accordance with a familiar format adopted from paper ledgers,
and many have nearly identical keystrokes as commands to perform
common functions. Even an experienced user can fail to discern
which spreadsheet program is loaded.
Another consequence of adoption of the copyright model for
software protection derives from a fundamental difference between
the substantive law of copyright relative to that of patents. Copy-
right is derived from the common law protection against plagiarism,
and accordingly focuses largely on the question of whether the al-
leged infringer in fact produced his work by "cribbing" from the
copyrighted work.5 Whereas a patent may be infringed by one who
arrives quite independently at the same mechanism on which a pat-
ent has issued. "[Copyright] law imposes no prohibition on those
who, without copying, independently arrive at the precise combina-
tion of words or notes which have been copyrighted."
6
This distinctive focus of copyright has played a major role in
decisions regarding software, and frames the issues for litigation in
a copyright case very differently than in other areas of intellectual
property.
Thus, Congress' adoption of the copyright model issued a call
to battle for a decade of struggle between jurisprudence and the
computer industry. The first guns have sounded.
5. E.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
851 (1947); Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-34, (3d Cir.
1986); J. Madison, The Federalist No. 43, at 309 (S. Cooke ed. 1981).
6. Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. Supp. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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III. THE SEMINAL DECISIONS ON SIMILARITY
Three decisions have delineated the issues in cases of appropri-
ation of commercially valuable aspects of a program. Synercom
Technology, Inc. v. University Computer Co.,' Whelan Associates,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,' and Broderbund Software,
Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.,9 differ fundamentally on what aspects of
a program are subject to copyright protection, on what evidence the
trier of fact should inspect for similarity, and on the roles of expert
and lay testimony. They differ implicitly on what the author should
register for copyright in order to secure the broadest protection.
Recently, a fourth case, Plains Cotton Cooperative v. Goodpas-
ture Computer Services,10 puts in doubt whether there can be any
meaningful protection for such property.
A. SynercoIm" Order and Sequence as Unprotectable Idea
Synercom Technology arose before the Software Act and out of
a technology less sophisticated than that associated with today's is-
sues of cloned operating systems and Lotus look-alikes. Indeed, the
copyrighted work in that case was not a computer program. How-
ever, even the relatively primitive technological context of that case
posed inescapable tensions between the conceptual categories of
software and those traditional to prior copyright law.
The plaintiff and defendant EDI t' had each developed a pro-
gram in the FORTRAN 2 language for doing engineering structural
analysis on mainframe computers. The copyrights were in plain-
tiff's users' manuals and in nine separately registered format illus-
trations describing techniques for preparing punched cards to be fed
into a computer running Synercom's STRAN 3 program. The cards
were to be punched in accordance with the pattern which Synercom
had devised to make it easier to feed the user's data to its program.
EDI's "Sacs II" program would have called for very different data
7. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computer Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D.
Tex. 1978).
8. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986).
9. Broderbund Software, Inc., v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
10. Plains Cotton Cooperative v. Goodpasture Computer Services, 807 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir. 1987).
11. Engineering Dynamics, Inc., the developer of the program marketed by defendant
University Computer Company.
12. FORTRAN ("FORmula TRANsactions") is a widely used programming language
especially suited for mathematical procedures and engineering applications.
13. STRAN ("STRucture ANalysis") program.
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patterns, but EDI had interposed a preprocessor program in FOR-
TRAN to reorient data punched to STRAN patterns into what Sacs
II required.
EDI's preprocessor conversion was commercially vital. It
allowed EDI to market Sacs II to the large base of users familiar
with the use of STRAN. The STRAN pattern was by no means
simple or self-evident; the court found that the plaintiff had invested
$500,000 in development, including the training of customer
personnel.
EDI effectively conceded at trial that its manual infringed
Synercom's manuals. 4 The importance of Synercom lies in its ap-
proach to the issues presented by plaintiff's claims that EDI's
preprocessor program infringed Synercom's copyrights in the "for-
mats." The court addressed those issues in terms that would have
been equally applicable if the parties' works had been programs
written in different computer languages.
Judge Higginbotham analogized broadly to the provisions of
§ 1(b) of the Copyright Act which gives the owner of a literary
work the exclusive right "to translate the copyrighted work into
another language or dialect," and volunteered an opinion that
[i]t is as clear an infringement to translate a computer program
from, for example, FORTRAN to ALGOL, as it is to translate a
novel or play from English to French. In each case the substance
of the expression (if one may speak in such contradictory lan-
guage) is the same.., with only the external manifestation of the
expression changing. 15
Whatever the merits of that analogy,16 Synercom posed the
14. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1014.
15. Id. at 1013, n.5.
16. The analogy may well be too facile. Whereas translating a work from one human
language to another artfully is somewhat more than a matter of transliteration and adjusting
for syntactical factors like word order, gender and case, the differences in the inherent logic of
different high-level computer languages (e.g., as between "structured" languages like Pascal
or a subroutine-centered language like COBOL) are so great as to suggest that the broader
categories of "adaptation" and "derivative works," which encompass turning the novel into
the play, provide a more suitable analogy than "translations." See Q-Co. Industries, Inc. v.
Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), correctly observing that the test of
whether a derivative work infringes, disregards differences between the works and focuses on
what has been appropriated and its importance to the new work. See also Findings Nos. 4
and 7 in SAS Institute, Inc. v. S&H Computer Systems, 605 F. Supp. 816, 818 (M.D. Tenn.
1985), which would support registration of Release 79.5 of plaintiff's own program as "deriv-
ative" of its Release 76.2, although by one measure only 30% of the code was common to
both. If unauthorized, such a derivative work infringes the prior work. See note 46, infra.
Converting an existing program to run under a different basic "operating system" con-
trol program ("MS-DOS," "Pick," "Unix," "VMS") and/or in a "hardware" environment of
1988]
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fundamental analytical problem of applying the axioms of copyright
in literary property to the subject matter of software. EDI argued
that its preprocessor program was an original implementation of the
idea or principle of Synercom's graphic formats (and manual texts),
which copyright cannot protect, unrelated and essentially dissimilar
to the expression of the idea which is protected.
This underlying but elusive distinction lies at the heart of the
copyright model which has been extended to software. Whereas a
patent grants a temporary monopoly over the novel conception re-
vealed in the patent disclosure,' 7 a copyright "does not give a mo-
nopoly over an idea... but merely protects against the unlawful
reproduction of an original work."' 8 In conventional copyright
terms, it is the artist's expression of the idea which may not be ap-
propriated by another.
On the face of it, EDI's argument appears sound, if ever the
distinction can allow wholly dissimilar programs directed at pro-
ducing the same data output to coexist without infringement. Two
programs intended to yield, e.g., a tabular display of the conven-
tional general ledger balance figures of a corporation, would not or-
dinarily be presumed to be similar for purposes of copyright
\infringement merely because the data output was similar.
In fact, as explained below, the two parties' works did not yield
comparable outputs. Additionally, inspection of the FORTRAN
source or object code for EDI's preprocessor would have revealed
no direct parallels to the Synercom writings; programming code
does not include the kind of graphic shapes, visible arrangements or
the kind of explanatory user directions that were in the manuals
(except for trivial, non-functional literal constants for screen labels
or prompts, like "Enter board dimensions:" and/or of the cursory
text that might appear on a "help screen").
distinctive architecture or capacities (single- vs. multi-user, distributed processing vs. central,
memory-intensive vs. I/O-intensive) can present comparable challenges. See e.g., the descrip-
tion of the problems encountered in preparing a work-alike of a modest $49.95 children's
program written for Apple Ile's to run on IBM PC's, in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison
World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1130-31 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
17. Patent law decisions give no basis for expecting patent protection for computer pro-
grams themselves, standing apart from industrial processes or the apparatus they may con-
trol. See In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (claim for means of controlling multi-
process computer functions allowed, where hardware for implementing means also claimed);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (process patent for curing rubber not unpatentable
because the process includes steps directed by computer program); Cf. Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584 (1978), and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (each declining to find inven-
tion where the novel feature of a process was in the controlling program).
18. 462 F. Supp. at 1012, n.4, citing and quoting Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists
Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Synercom contended that its idea was the abstract conception
of a manner in which user data could be presented to the computa-
tion modules of its program and that the arrangement or order and
sequence for the data constituted the expression of its authorship.
Of necessity, it argued that its "expression" was less concrete than
that part of its work which could have been reproduced into a visual
medium (e.g., by photocopies, drawings by hand, video images).
EDI indisputably had access to, and had appropriated, that order
and sequence.
The argument has its merits. In copyright contexts, the me-
dium is not the message. It is clear, for example, that a musical
composition embodied in sheet music can be infringed by live or
phonorecorded performance. The converse also applies. One who
listens to a musical or dramatic performance and produces written
parts or dialogue scripts from memory has "reproduced" it. (E.g.,
Leo Feist, Inc. v. Demarie.19
Nonetheless, it would be conceptually difficult to entertain a
contention that an Ansel Adams photograph of a Grand Canyon
sunset infringed passages of a similar theme in Dvorak's "From The
New World," or that "Pelias and Melisande" on canvas infringed a
scene in the opera on the same theme. The order and sequence of
elements in a work of authorship ordinarily may be part of the ex-
pression. However, infringement surely requires similar ordering or
sequence of elements of like kind. The order, sequence and relative
duration of the notes in the main coda from Beethoven's 5th are
each paralleled in the Morse code dit-dit-dit-da for the letter "V",
but the elements ordered in the two works, and the works them-
selves, are incomparable.
In Synercom, the elements of plaintiff's graphic formats and of
defendant's preprocessor program were as different as those of, e.g.,
an oil painting of sunlight and a tone poem on the theme of dark-
ness. Synercom's illustrations instructed the eye and hand of a
human being to take numbers from specifications and worksheets
and to keypunch it in the STRAN sequence. EDI's program was
what 17 U.S.C. § 101 now defines as a "set of statements or instruc-
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer," directing the
machine to take numbers on cards punched in the STRAN se-
quence out of that order and to reorient them into the very distinct
sequence required by the computational routines of Sacs II.
Moreover, there was no common ordering of the elements of
19. 16 F. Supp. 827, 828 (W.D. La. 1935).
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Synercom's formats and EDI's code. Synercom's graphic elements
were ordered to the STRAN sequence of punched holes, whereas
EDI's verbal commands were ordered by the "syntactical" confines
of FORTRAN in producing the other sequence.
Whatever rights of authorship might have subsisted in plain-
tiff's bare sequence, plaintiff manifestly had no intellectual or prop-
erty interest in either the different sequence required by EDI's Sacs
II or EDI's expression, in programming code, of means to alter data
into the Sacs II order. From that perspective alone, the case should
have been an eminently simple one.
On the other hand, there was evidence of plagiarism in copying
the manuals' texts and in the appropriation of the commercial ad-
vantage of starting with the STRAN input formats. The court
therefore attempted to enunciate a general rule within recognized
categories of copyright protection for its denial of relief on the for-
mats. It had to do so without the benefits of having in evidence a
tangible embodiment of the allegedly infringing work, i.e., a
printout of EDI's source code, or of having expert testimony on the
dissimilarities in elements, function and technical rules governing
the arrangement of (a) the command elements of EDI's work and
(b) the data elements in Synercom's format.
The court found parallels to the formats in the recognized cate-
gory of copyright protection of blank forms. That parallel has since
figured in each subsequent software case. It observed that whereas
the "sequencing of data for simplified access to the computer pro-
grams" was the utilitarian substance of the formats, Synercom's for-
mats communicated it "by their placements of lines, shaded art and
words."2 ° In reciting Copyright Circular 32's2 declaration that
"there is no way to secure copyright protection for the idea or prin-
ciple behind a blank form or similar work, or for any of the meth-
ods or systems involved in it," the court concluded that it was those
artistic elements, not the substance, in which plaintiff had
copyrights.22
From those thoughts the court proposed a far-reaching analy-
sis of dissimilar meanings for "idea" and "expression" in artistic
works and functional works. According to the authorities, it said,
[I]n cases of literary or artistic works, and works of a similar
character, in which the form, arrangement or combination of
ideas represents the product of labor and skilled effort separate
20. 462 F. Supp. at 1012.
21. Id. at 1014.
22. See Baker v. Shelden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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and apart from that entailed in the development of the intellec-
tual conception involved.., the medium of expression is entitled
to protection by copyright against adoption by another in similar
form, arrangement, and combination.
2 3
By contrast, the court said that among utilitarian works, such
as computer programs, it may be that less can be owned:
[I]f order and sequence is the expression, the skilled effort is not
separable, for the form, arrangement, and combination is itself
the intellectual conception involved. It would follow that only to
the extent the expressions involve stylistic creativity above and
beyond the bare expression of sequence and arrangement, should
they be protected. (emphasis added) 24
In so indicating, Judge Higginbotham accurately presented the
central difficulty in software copyrights: in aesthetic works, the or-
der and sequencing of the elements may constitute the "art" pro-
tected by the law; "'Nevermore,' quoth the raven," or "A rose
would smell as sweet by any other name," can lose the savor of the
originals, and concomitantly the legal protection. For a utilitarian
program, there can be a number of techniques for producing each
small result within the overall program such as determining the dis-
playing of the date. Many of them are functionally equivalent in a
gross sense.
Nonetheless, some solutions are elegant, and some pedestrian.
Some are among the conventional tools of the trade, and some will
reflect significant advances in the state of the art.
Which of them the programmer selects, or invents, and merges
into the overall work, may be of little consequence and no visibility
to the user, but his choices determine the precision, efficiency and
speed with which the desired result is achieved.
Other choices restrict or increase the languages into which the
program can be readily translated, and/or the kinds of computers
on which it can run. These choices represent the programmer's cre-
ative and skilled work no less than more visible stylistic flourishes.
Aesthetic elements are largely confined to aspects of the user
interface, such as striking video characteristics in screen displays,
mouse activation of icons 25 in lieu of selection from menus or per-
23. Quoted in Long v. Jordan, 29 F. Supp. 287, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1939), quoted in
Synercom Tech. v. University Computer Co., 462 F. Supp. at 1012-13 (1978).
24. Id. at 1014.
25. "Icons" are screen images visually symbolizing functions. For example, a stylized
wastebasket may signify discarding a file. The function is usually selected by moving a screen
image of an arrow to the icon, using a "mouse."
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emptory status messages like "wait" instead of homey ones like
"I'm thinking." These are largely incidental to the core capabilities
of a program, but may be of great importance to the commercial
success of some classes of mass-market software, and often entail a
high proportion of the coding2 6 of such products. They can also be
the aspects of such programs potential competitors most desire to
clone.
User interface characteristics had no place in Synercom.
STRAN and Sacs II were aimed at an engineering market, and
arose in an era of punch devices, before the advent of interactive
keyboards and screens, much less color graphics and voice synthe-
sis. The idea-expression dichotomy there may have been exagger-
ated because the record presented no occasion for recognition of
such aesthetic expression.27
B. Whelan: Order and Structure As Protected Expression
What must be filed to register a program for copyright is a
fraction of the programming code in its visible, source, embodi-
ment.28 That requirement surely suggests that what is distinctive
and protected by a Software Act copyright extends beyond user in-
terface elements displayed when the program is run. The sugges-
tion is strengthened by the circumstance that much software has no
user interface. Many programs control machines to which the digi-
tal components are peripheral (machine tools, VCR's, engine fuel
systems), or direct system-level computer functions that never man-
ifest themselves to the user.
The Synercom definition of "expression" would, if extended to
Software Act cases, deny copyright protection to the "arrangement,
order and structure" in all computer-capable works. Such an exten-
sion was considered and rejected on carefully reasoned and artfully
expressed grounds in a major recent decision, Whelan Associates,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc..29 It was also rejected, on the
authority of Whelan, in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World,
26. "Coding" is the detailed process of creating a program by writing sequences of
verbal commands to govern each step to be done. The commands, in the vocabulary and
syntax of a programming language, constitute the "source code." See Whelan Assoc. v. Jas-
low Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d at 1230-31 (3d Cir. 1986).
27. See Deposit of Copies and Phonorecords for copyright registration. 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A) (1986).
28. But see the discussion of Broderbund Software, infra, where the court constricted its
consideration to the user interface, to the exclusion of the aspects of program addressing the
machine and the data.
29. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d
Cir. 1986).
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Inc. 3o where, as will be noted, an enormously broader degree of pro-
tection was afforded on the basis of a seductively simple reading of
some small part of Whelan.
The primary differences between these two decisions was dic-
tated by the records the courts considered: In Whelan, expert testi-
mony on similarities in the central routines of the programs was
taken and given great weight; in Broderbund, the court limited its
consideration to the sensible menu screens, and deemed itself bound
under Ninth Circuit decisions to rely on application of an ordinary
reasonable person standard of perceived similarity.
In Whelan, the situation presented precisely what had been hy-
pothesized in Judge Higginbotham's Note 5: the translation of a
program from one computer language into another.
Both the copyrighted program and the allegedly infringing
program served to keep books and guide administration of dental
prosthetics laboratories; each performed the same functions for the
user, each using much the same internal file structures to do so, and
each generating similar data for the lab. In addition to their near-
identity in external function, there were inescapable similarities in
the visible stylistic aspects of the two programs when they executed,
i.e., in the menus apprehensible to the user's senses, and in the la-
beled screen outputs or data displays.31
Those observations, however, were treated by the court as
merely beginning the factual and legal inquiry. It cast the legal is-
sue as being one of whether, in the absence of literal copying of the
programming code, copyright could protect the basic structure, se-
quence, and organization of a copyrighted program.32 That phrase-
ology33 was more than a paraphrase of Synercom, even though the
earlier decision was clearly pertinent, because the elements ordered
in the copyrighted work in Whelan were program instructions.
Literal copying of the registered code was clearly absent in the
narrow sense, because with respect to source, the two programs
were in different and dissimilar languages; and because, with respect
30. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
31. See the illustration that is Appendix A to the opinion, 797 F.2d at 1249.
32. Id. at 1224, 1248.
33. Footnote I to the passage provides a sharp cautionary note to those inclined to
citation by headnote or by court synopsis: Although Whelan is already cited, as it is above,
for the proposition that copyrights extend "beyond a program's literal code to their structure,
sequence and organization," footnote 1 declares that the opinion uses the three words inter-
changeably, as synonyms. The content of the single concept must be discerned in the context
of the opinion.
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to object code, they were for different machines. The copyrighted
program had been written in 1979 in EDL, a language specific to an
early microcomputer, the IBM System 1. The infringing program,
however, was written four years later in BASIC, to run on IBM's
new standard for microcomputers,"4 the Personal Computer.
With narrow exceptions for use of disassemblers, 5 there can be
reproduction of program code only (a) by wholesale mechanical
copying, on a computer, of the entirety of the object code distrib-
uted to user-licensees - which can be discerned almost as readily in
that industry as it can in the record business36 or (b) where there
has been an employment or business relationship between owner
and infringer giving the latter access to the former's source code.3 7
34. "Microcomputers" are computers based on "micro-processors," single-chip logic
processors in which memory management functions, arithmetic logic units, storage registers,
and related elements are integrated. They are often desk-top units.
35. Disassemblers, simple versions of which are part of the debugging utilities provided
with many systems, blur the line between reverse engineering and outright copying. Running
object code, the binary number sequences that the machine reads but which are meaningless
to the human senses, through a disassembler produces human-readable assembly language
commands, from which an expert programmer can discern all the logic and structure of the
original program. This is so even if the original was compiled from source code written in a
higher level language. From the assembly language, such a programmer can, albeit tediously,
reconstruct the original flow chart of the program, and can proceed to recode it. For author-
ity that doing so is legitimate, see E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485,
1490, 1492 (D.C. Minn. 1985). While the recoding may entail any number of equivalent
variations from the first programmer's choices, including a different language, those varia-
tions can largely disappear when his reconstruction is recompiled, resulting in object code
effectively identical to what was disassembled.
36. Software piracy cases often entail "copying the exact number and sequence of bytes
or items by which Plaintiff's program causes the machine to operate." Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 782 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521
(9th Cir. 1984). There it was noted that:
Such appropriation is quite feasible; the testimony from experts offered on this
motion [for a preliminary injunction] confirms that the process of duplicating
or copying a program, once it is put into usable form in a ROM or diskette, is
almost absurdly simple. Diskettes can be copied for a minimal cost by anyone
with rudimentary technical skill and a few pieces of equipment, and ROMs
require only slightly greater sophistication.
Id. at 783.
Any general-purpose computer can copy a program onto diskette or tape, with utilities
built into the computer's operating system; indeed § 117 of the Copyright Act of 1980, as
amended, expressly authorizes such copying for archival purposes (making a reserve copy of
the program in the event of damage to the original). Reasonably priced tools are widely
advertised and readily available for reproducing a program from and/or onto a ROM chip.
37. A case was posed in SAS Institute, Inc. v. S&H Computer Systems, 605 F. Supp.
816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), where access to source was obtained by abusing a user license, and
the offending work was a port to different equipment, effected by re-coding done by program-
mers given the licensed source. The result was wholesale, but not verbatim, reproduction.
The court's findings, at 822-26, provide a reliable guide to the varieties of smoking gun simi-
larities which can be developed in a well-prepared case; they range from near-identity in the
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Source code is usually protected as a trade secret, by nondisclosure
except subject to a confidentiality agreement, and - unlike other
literary works - is ordinarily neither published when the program
is sold on disk or tape nor displayed to the public.38 Source copying
can be partial and subtle: particularly useful or innovative routines
or modules can be appropriated into otherwise quite different code,
and can become part of the appropriator's standard library of func-
tions or tools.
One defendant in Whelan, Jaslow Laboratory, had engaged
plaintiff's assignor to develop software to manage the operations of
its prosthetics business, and had authorized the developer to mar-
ket the resulting program to others on a royalty basis. Whelan was
formed by the chief programmer of that name after delivery of the
program, called Dentalab, and succeeded to the developer's rights.
Whelan appointed Jaslow its sales agent for it on a best efforts basis.
Dentalab was obsoleted for general market purposes by the
passage of the System 1 and its EDL language. Jaslow's principal
hired programmers to develop the allegedly infringing BASIC pro-
gram, which he called Dentcom, to be marketed among labs acquir-
ing the new PC's. He and a brother formed a company also called
Dentcom to sell it, terminated the marketing contract with Whelan,
and gave the latter notice that any sales of Dentalab would be ac-
tionable disclosure of Jaslow's trade secrets. When Whelan contin-
ued sales, Dentcom sued on that ground. Whelan counterclaimed
for copyright violations, and removed the action (reversing the
parties).
At trial, Whelan's expert testified39 from a review of the par-
code for 44 subroutines and 69 of 70 parallel interface routines, to incorporation of a module
serving no purpose in the copy and ungrammatical and incoherent lines of code remaining
after characters had been revised to disguise the origin. In this connection, but at a much
higher level of technological sophistication in analysis, see E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp.,
623 F. Supp. 1485, 1492, 1494-97 (D.C. Minn. 1985). Another finding, at 818, establishes the
nonreality of a literal identity requirement: plaintiff's own latest upgrade lacked verbatim
identity with its predecessor in 67-70% of its lines of code.
38. Whelan was not unrepresentative in this particular situation because the programs
were sold in uncompiled source, to be used with the interpreters in the purchasers' com-
puters, but the court deemed the circumstance nonmaterial. 797 F.2d at 1231, n.20.
39. In one of its most consequential rulings, the court of appeals rejected, as potentially
misleading and as of doubtful value in copyright cases "involving exceptionally difficult
materials, like computer programs," the evidentiary rule of Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,
468-69 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947) previously adopted for the Third
Circuit in copyright cases generally, in Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904,
907, (3d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975) whereby the intrinsic test of substantial
similarity, i., whether what was appropriated is enough to make the challenged work in-
fringing, had to be determined by the response of an ordinary observer; and expert testimony
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ties' source codes that the BASIC Dentcom was not merely a direct
translation from EDL of Dentalab, but that the file structures and
screen outputs were virtually identical, and that the five subroutines
basic to each of the programs performed almost identically. Jas-
low's expert testified to "substantive differences in the programming
style, in programming structure, in algorithms and data structures,"
but his report acknowledged "overall structural similarities" be-
tween the two."0 Compare the "total concept and feel" test dis-
cussed in Broderbund" discussed infra.
The trial court found all issues for Whelan. On copyright in-
fringement, it found "that the Dentcom system, although written in
another computer language from the Dentalab, and although not a
direct transliteration of Dentalab, was substantially similar to
Dentalab because its structure and overall organization were sub-
stantially similar."'42
On the legal question of what constituted the protectable ex-
pression, the trial court, per Judge Van Artsdalen, observed that
other dental lab programs accomplished the same functions and in-
corporated many of the same ideas, but that
There are many ways the same data may be organized, assem-
bled, held, retrieved and utilized by a computer .... The expres-
sion of the idea in a software computer program is the manner in
which the program operates, controls and regulates the com-
puter's receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating,
and producing useful information either on a screen, printout or
by audio information. 43
Judge Van Artsdalen may have viewed the desired result for
the program, in the sense of the application for which it was writ-
ten, as the idea or principle of the work. The passage above also
states:
could be admitted only on the extrinsic test of substantial similarity, Le., whether the alleged
infringer in fact made use of the copyrighted work. 797 F.2d at 1232-33.
40. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1228.
41. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1137.
42. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1985), as paraphrased at 797 F.2d at
1229.
43. 609 F. Supp. at 1320. Fairly read, the "screen, printout or ... audio" phrase has
application only to the subset of interactive, user-oriented programs which have display and
reporting functions. However, the inclusion of calculating and data-flow functions places the
focus correctly on how any program operates, not just on how it appears to a user, if at all.
Two programs developed from a common flow chart may be implemented quite differently by
a variety of programmer (and/or compiler) options regarding, e.g., what arithmetic logic unit
operations shall be involved in what order, what memory variables shall be sustained, and
what information shall be held in volatile memory rather than written off to disk for later
recovery.
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Different computer systems may functionally serve similar pur-
poses without being copies of each other. There is evidence in
the record that there are other software programs for the busi-
ness management of dental laboratories. There is no contention
that any of them infringe although they may incorporate many of
the same ideas and functions.
44
There is a vast conceptual middle ground between "idea" in
this macrocosmic sense, and in the sense of the means selected by
the author for implementation of a particular program function or
set of functions. Copyright cases have yet to address whether a
novel algorithm, or a novel application of a known algorithm, is
merely an idea, or instead an expression of the idea that a particular
function be implemented."
On Jaslow's appeal, the Third Circuit, in a remarkable opinion
by Judge Edward Becker, acknowledged it confronted a "case of
first impression in the courts of appeals.",46 It affirmed, upon reach-
ing the conclusions (a) that the National Commission on New
Technological Use of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), and, by exten-
44. Id.; The plaintiff in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F.
Supp. 775, 782 (C.D. Cal. 1983), 725 F.2d 521, 523-25 (1984), "introduced evidence, which
was not directly controverted by Defendant, that numerous methods exist for writing the
programs involved here that would be 98% compatible with Apple computers, yet not so
similar to Plaintiff's particular sequence as to infringe its copyright." That case involved
fundamental operating system programs, where mechanical limitations may restrict some
programming options; most applications programs allow more flexibility in seeking out
equivalents.
45. CONTU evidently intended a contention that a given task could only be accom-
plished by specific programming code to be only an affirmative defense to infringement of that
segment of code, rather than a ground for re-defining the whole of the first program to in-
clude that code as an uncopyrightable manifestation of a principle of logic, inadvertantly
placed in the public domain at publication. It stated, at p. 20 of its Final Report, that "when
specific instructions, even though previously copyrighted, are the only and essential means of
accomplishing a given task, their later use by another will not amount to an infringement."
See E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 n.4, 1501 n.16
(D.C. Minn. 1985), treating this as equivalent at the bottom line to a finding of no substantial
similarity.
The CONTU approach, although procedurally appealing, is too narrow in its focus on
verbatim identity. Even a novel algorithm may be implemented by any number of different
programming instructions. That difficulty was obscured in E.F. Johnson by the circum-
stances (a) that the programs in evidence were in assembly and hexadecimal machine nota-
tion, written in rudimentary instructions and inflexible syntax, and (b) that infringing
routines had been copied so slavishly as to use instructions inappropriate to defendant's hard-
ware and to repeat plaintiff's mistakes. Id. at 1494-96.
Indeed, the court there found only one code number in plaintiff's program essential to
the application. Id. at 1494. It also found other elements infringed notwithstanding dissimi-
larities apparent in a line-by-line comparison of the parties' disassembled coding (it deemed
the dissimilarities unconvincing, in view of evidence those elements had in fact been adapted
from a disassembled copy of Johnson's program). Id. at 1497-98.
46. Whelan, 797 F.2d 1222, 1224
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sion, the Congress which adopted its recommendations as the
Software Act without generating a legislative history of delibera-
tions of its own, "intended copyright protection to extend beyond
the literal code,"4 7 and (b) that "the detailed structure of the
Dentalab program is part of the expression, not the idea, of that
program. '
4 8
Judge Becker noted that the CONTU report had included flow
charts, with source and object code, as "works of authorship in
which copyright subsists," and that the circumstance "demon-
strate[d] that the Commission intended copyright protection to ex-
tend beyond the literal code," but that CONTU had looked 'to
caselaw development for resolution of the "dichotomy between idea
and expression."49
The reference to flow charts was highly suggestive. A flow
chart schematically defines, in standardized graphic figures, each of
the principal operations of the program to be written, and some-
thing of the logical relationship among those gross operations. Be-
cause a flow chart is devised before coding begins (although often
after the data structures are settled), and because it does not detail
the specific means of effecting the operations it conceptualizes, one
could readily view it as a diagram of the problems addressed or of
the idea for addressing them, rather than as an expression of the
author's specific solution. Even Synercom treated the level of speci-
ficity characteristic of a flow chart as "requiring substantial imagi-
nation, creativity, independent thought and exercise of discretion,"
but as being so far from a completed program in terms of abstrac-
tion as to make chart and code "really two different expressions of
the same idea, rather than two different versions of the same
expression. '
It is certainly true that the flow chart is remote in content and
kind from the finished program. Programs in different languages,
for different computer environments, can be developed from a single
flow chart without sharing a single line of code, and/or without
sharing anything by way of front end appearance or output format.
The flow chart is akin to a scenario or story outline, and is as sepa-
rately copyrightable from various adaptations or projections of it as
are a stage play, a libretto, a photoplay, or a novel. That observa-
47. Id. at 1241.
48. Id.
49. Synercom Tech, 462 F. Supp. at 1013, n.5.
50. E.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op. Prod., Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
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tion begs the question of infringement, however, as much in the
computer context as it does in the literary. The photoplay (and the
film made of it), although eligible for separate copyrights as a de-
rivative work, may well infringe the scenario from which it derives.
And the stage play may infringe both."l If the preliminary flow
chart were the proper material of software copyright in the relevant
sense of a work from which a program is derived (not just in the
sense that a rudimentary textual or pictorial work is protected
against facsimile reproduction) - and it is routine in industry to
impress copyright bugs or proprietary notices on flow charts no less
than on shop drawings - then cases like Whelan might be decided
without resort to the implementing code. Further legal develop-
ments can be expected on that thorny subject, especially in light of
the ruling on analogous design specifications in Plains Cotton Co-op
v. Goodpasture, discussed below.
The opinion recognized that the question was complicated by
the distinction between literary or artistic works and utilitarian
works, which had been noted in Synercom. It therefore began its
analysis with Baker v. Selden, 52 "a seminal case in the law of copy-
right generally," and "particularly relevant here because, like the
instant case, it involved a utilitarian work, rather than an artistic or
fictional one."53
Baker v. Selden involved a book of blank forms and explana-
tory text for a new, simplified system of bookkeeping. Defendant
Baker promoted a competing accounting system that reproduced
Selden's forms, and Selden sued. The system was concededly not
copyrightable (although dictum suggested it might be a patentable
invention), and Baker's text was non-infringing. The issue was
whether the forms embodied Selden's idea, or were part of its ex-
pression. The Supreme Court held that where the art, meaning Sel-
51. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
52. The contention that utilitarian character in itself makes a work unprotectable has
been rejected in the software context. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562
F. Supp. 775, 781-82 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff. at 725 F.2d 521, 523-25 (9th Cir. 1984) (sale of
allegedly infringing boot program, DOS [Disk Operating System], BASIC language, etc. pre-
liminarily enjoined); Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870,
876-77 (3rd Cir. 1982) (system-level programs "fixed" in ROM [Read-Only Memory] chips).
The CONTU report expressly opted in favor of protection for utilitarian works in general
and, despite minority opinions expressing reservations on policy grounds, in exclusively utili-
tarian operating system programs governing the internal procedures by which a computer
executes user-level programs in particular. CONTU Report, 17, 20-21, 26-27, 37. But cf.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982) rev'd,
714 F.2d 1240, 1250 (3rd Cir. 1983) (denying preliminary injunction against sale of alleged
copies of the same items at issue in Formula International case).
53. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 103.
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den's accounting system, "cannot be used without employing the
methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book," or "similar"
forms, the "methods and diagrams" are part of the conception, and
are no more protected by copyright than the system in the
abstract. 4
To Judge Becker, Baker v. Selden implied that: "[Tjhe purpose
or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and every-
thing that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part
of the expression of the idea." [emphasis in original]51
He cited Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc.,56
where the functions a computer program performed were deemed a
non-protectable idea, but the code expressing it by specific program-
ming commands and techniques was protected from reproduction
through reverse engineering.
The court found analogies in the decisions denying copyright
protection to scenes afaire, "incidents, characters or settings which
are as a practical matter indispensable ... in the treatment of a
given topic,""7 and in those limiting protection to "fact-intensive
works" like news articles, historical works, and compilations. 8
In both areas, the court found the rationale to be "that there
are only a limited number of ways to express factual material, and
therefore the purpose of the literary work - telling a truthful story
- can be accomplished only by employing one of a limited number
of devices. [Citation] Those devices therefore belong to the idea,
"159not the expression....
At that point the court shifted to consider the pragmatic impli-
cations of the possible alternative rules. The court discussed the
rule granting protection to distinctive aspects of a program, to an
extent comparable to that for fact-intensive works, beyond protec-
tion limited to literal copying, but not extending to anything neces-
sary to effecting the function it serves by other specific means. It
stated that
[W]e... believe that the rule Would advance the basic purpose
underlying the idea/expression distinction, 'the preservation of
54. Whelan, 797 F.2d 1222, 1236.
55. Apple Computer, 562 F. Supp. at 783.
56. Id. See Atari Inc. v. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672
F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (computer games); Landsberg
v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1037 (1984) (table game).
57. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981).
58. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237.
59. Id.
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the balance between competition and protection reflected in the
patent and copyright laws ... '60
In so asserting, the court referred to its earlier citations for the
proposition that coding consumes only about 20% of the effort in
software development, and stated:
Among the more significant costs in computer programming are
those attributable to developing the structure and logic of the
program. The rule proposed here ... would provide the proper
incentive for programmers by protecting their most valuable ef-
forts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the development
of new computer devices that accomplish the same end. 6'
It rejected as irrelevant in other copyright contexts the objec-
tions (a) that "computer programs are so intricate, each step so de-
pendent on all of the other steps, that they are almost impossible to
copy except literally, and that anyone who attempts to copy the
structure of a program without copying its literal elements must
expend a tremendous amount of effort and creativity,"62 (b) that the
concept of program structure is too vague a guide for litigation,63
and (c) that progress in software is achieved on the backs of those
who have gone before, and "requires plagiarizing in some manner
the underlying copyrighted work."'
Having determined that software cases required no more se-
vere a standard than the conventional copyright test of substantial
similarity, the Whelan court considered expert evidence of similari-
ties in two external (user-sensible) areas and in one internal pro-
gram structure and logic.
60. Id., citing Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 466 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
Cir. 1971).
61. See Note, Copyrighted Computer Programs, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 1264, 1290 (1984)
("almost the same amount of time as the original programmer expended").
62. Radcliffe, Recent Developments in Copyright Law Related to Software, 4 Computer
L. Rep. 189, 194-97 (1985).
63. Note, 68 Minn. L. Rev., n.55, at 1292, quoted in Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237-38.
64. 797 F.2d at 1243. The court also cites Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252-53 (3rd Cir. 1983); and Manpower, Inc. v. Temporary Help of
Harrisburg, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1965). See also Edwin K. Williams & Co. v.
Edwin K. Williams & Co. - East, 542 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908
(1977); Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keither Clark, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 650, 652, 655 (N.D. Ill.),
aff'd per curiam, 505 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1974); Harcourt Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic
Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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IV. EXTERNAL MANIFESTATIONS OF STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY
A. File Structures
Whelan complained that Dentcom had reproduced the file
structures of Dentalab. Jaslow did not dispute the fact, but argued
that (a) file structures, like blank forms, are merely part of the idea,
under Baker v. Selden, and (b) protecting file structures would par-
ticularly raise the problem of foreclosing an entire area of program-
ming art, in that its expert witness had testified that there were few,
if any, alternatives.
File structures are classified here as external because they are
largely, if not fully, discernible from screen templates guiding data
entry, in that the prompts calling for certain information to be
keyed and the space provided for each response define what types of
data are stored, whether each item is textual, numeric, or mixed,
and much of the items' inter-relationships. The nature of file struc-
tures is discussed hereinafter.
The court rejected that reading of Baker, on the basis of Third
Circuit decisions construing its placement of forms on the idea/ex-
pression spectrum less mechanically;65 and held that, compared to
the Selden forms in terms of comprehensiveness and complexity,
the file structures of the programs were "sufficiently informative to
deserve copyright protection."66
It approached more charily the question of whether Dentalab's
structures must nonetheless be denied protection as the only frame-
work in which a program for that function could be realized, so the
idea was merged in the expression and that enforcing copyrights in
them would be tantamount to granting a monopoly over programs
of the type. It based its conclusion on the record before it that other
programs for the function "might use significantly different file
structures,"67 and declined to reverse on the basis of a matter of
technical expertise on which the trial court had rejected contrary
opinion testimony as unconvincing. However, it suggested it might
have reached a different conclusion "had the defendants offered
more evidence to support their position" on the point, and noted, in
dictum of which more will no doubt be heard, that:
It is true that for certain tasks there are only a very limited
number of file structures available, and in such cases the struc-
tures might not be copyrightable and similarity of file structures
65. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1243.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1243, n.43.
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might not be strongly probative of similarity of the program[s] as
a whole. We are simply not convinced that this is such a case.6 s
The author strongly suggests that the dictum reserves judg-
ment too cautiously. In the first place, defining "file structures," in
the narrow sense of ordering the elements of an electronic blank
form, is a preliminary and relatively trivial part of program design,
and would be recognized as such even by lawyers who build tickler
files in dBASE III or use Pascal's "Record" command to define
simple sequential files.
In the second place, it would be difficult, for example, to iden-
tify a software submarket, in terms of size and type of machines or
size and type of business, which does not include a large number of
plain or fancy business accounting packages to track cash receipts
and expenditures, receivables and payables, payroll and associated
taxes, and the like, each incorporating certain file structures dic-
tated by accounting conventions. 69 In such fields, the software in-
dustry and users of its products would be disruptively surprised by
a rule leaving it a litigable issue whether all other packages infringe
copyrights in the first (or in Selden's forms). The conventional
function restricts the tolerable range of variation in fundamental file
structures to such a point as to make protection a socially undesir-
able restriction on hitherto lively competition.
There is another example broached in the opinion in a slightly
different context: it is difficult to visualize how any key word in
context full-text retrieval system, whether for office text files, litiga-
tion documents or a public database, could be devised without reli-
ance on indexing schemes fundamentally similar to those at least
externally familiar to users of "Westlaw" and "Lexis."7 ° It would
be radical indeed if a court were to conclude that such an indexing
68. E.g., expenditures posted to a ledger payables detail file by date; amount in decimal
numbers; and account-type code, reserving space for date, amount and item of payment;
those items carried from there in running totals for encompassing categories to an income
statement report, and to either current or fixed assets-and-liabilities files, as dictated by the
account-type code.
69. Computer file "indexes" are the second logical tier of any file structures more ad-
vanced than those used for private electronic phone lists or baseball card collection data.
70. The same tabular data may be stored and accessed according to any of several dif-
ferent logical schemes, which can require very different computer operations to effect its ma-
nipulation and retrieval. An indexed sequential scheme relies on computer-generated tables
of the physical locations of the data items, conceptualized as a sequence of identically-struc-
tured index cards or pages, each item identified by the "distance" from a beginning point at
which it begins. Network and hierarchial schemes place the items along the branches of an
"inverted tree structure," rather than along a line of only one dimension. Relational schemes
array date items along multiple parallel lines associating the items on each line according to
recurring "key" items.
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scheme was the exclusive property of the first to use it in some
broad or narrow context.
If file structures are to be considered for aspects of the expres-
sion, development of the law in this area may require consideration
of refinements on the blank form analogy for file structures to dis-
tinguish indexed sequential, network, hierarchical and relational
structures.71 Certainly the selection of one such type of structure is
in the realm of idea, but the programmer's choice has inescapable
consequences on the choices of (1) what file-placement data (keys)
shall go in the separate records, tables, relations, etc., and (2) what
logic will be adopted in the operative routines of the program to
effect storage and retrieval.
Those factors pose issues of whether, e.g., two payables files
differentiated only by placement data fields or columns included to
implement the respective file-integration schemes are substantially
similar; of whether coding to gather data from a network file struc-
ture is really dissimilar from coding to gather it from a relational
structure; and of whether the answers differ on the basis of whether
the program was written ab initio or within a database management
system environment where the DBMS72 supplies that which differs
between the two sets of structures. These are not productive lines of
inquiry. Synercom showed greater wisdom with respect to the
blank forms analogy.
B. Screen Outputs
The second aspect of similarity considered was in screen out-
puts. The trial court had stated with disconcerting informality that:
One thing is apparent to even the most casual untrained ob-
servation of the operation of the two systems - the visual
screens that are displayed are almost identical in format and even
in use of abbreviations and terminology. There is credible evi-
dence that prospective users and customers at trade shows found
no substantial difference between the [two], and considered them
to be the same.73
On appeal, Dentcom argued that the screen's appearances were
71. A Database Management System (DBMS) is a fundamental computer management
program permitting items of user-defined data to be entered, stored, manipulated and re-
trieved selectively.
72. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1322.
73. Aspects of Dentalab were the subject of four registrations, two covering the original
and enhanced code, and two on installation and user's manuals. All were "literary" on Form
TX. The trial court had found all four valid. 609 F. Supp. 1312, 1323.
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(or should have been) covered by a variety of copyrights other than
those on the registrations of which Whelan claimed,74 and that the
screen outputs "bear no relation to the programs that produce
them."75
The opinion acknowledged that "screen outputs are considered
audio-visual works under the copyright code,'' 76 and that Whelan
"asserts no claim of. . . infringement with respect to the screen
outputs,"7 7 but held that "the only conclusion to be drawn from the
fact of the different copyrights is that the screen output cannot be
direct evidence of copyright infringement [of the registered literary
work]."7" It declared the trial court's quoted statement to be a
valid one of evidence, under Fed. R. Evid. §§ 401 and 403:
There is no reason, however, why material falling under one
copyright category could not be indirect, inferential evidence of
the nature of material covered by another copyright.7 9
The court nonetheless acknowledged, on a point that would be
overlooked with significant consequences in Broderbund that there
was force to the argument that
It is still possible ... that the risk of unfair prejudice would
overweigh the probative value of the evidence.., one might ar-
gue that, because the screen outputs are visible and easily under-
stood (at least as compared with the obscure details of computer
programs), they might have disproportionate influence on the
trier of fact [although] they might say very little about the under-
74. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244.
75. Id. at 1244, citing Williams Electronics v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870,
874 (3rd Cir. 1982) (video displays in computer game protected as audio-visual works, 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(6)); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(same, but noting that operational aspects of "PAC-MAN" game program, also registered as
literary work, were infringed although screen display was not reproduced); and Stern Elec-
tronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (literary registration of code
proper to protect program yielding audio-visual displays, but suggesting the Form TX regis-
tration would not protect against a different set of instructions producing visually identical
displays). See also, Atari, Inc. v. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672
F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), where the only copyrights claimed in the "PAC-MAN" video game
were audio-visual (no doubt because of the legal uncertainties as to whether any but the
sensible, artistic elements of a game in any medium are eligible for copyright). Compare
Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945) with 1 Nimmer § 2.18(H)(3).
Infringement of very narrowly construed rights in the "size, shape, and manner of move-
ment," pie-wedge "mouth" and gobbling sounds of the plaintiff's hunter and hunted figures,
and in its "regeneration" process, were held infringed.
76. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1245.
1988]
72 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
lying program.8°
On the record before it, the court of appeals found the Rule
403 argument unpersuasive of reversible error, noting it was no
matter of plain error because defendant had not objected to the tes-
timony on screen appearances (which, from what was said below,
was indirect), and that the party against whom screen outputs were
asserted "could easily explain their limited probative value."81
Whelan could be sanguine about litigants' ability to overcome
the disproportionate influence of screen appearance on ordinary ob-
servers because it had accepted the expert testimony required to
overcome it on intrinsic similarity. In jurisdictions less liberal on
the evidentiary question, the ruling on screen outputs may prove
pernicious.
Screen similarities might better be considered as possible mis-
representations of origin or performance under § 43(a) of the Lan-
ham (Trademark) Act,8" where customer response surveys have an
accustomed and directly relevant role; or as evidence of deceptive
trade dress.
C. The Five Subroutines
Having held that it would not apply the ordinary observer test
in copyright cases "involving exceptionally difficult materials, like
computer programs, 813 and that literal identity between the parties'
works was no more needed for infringement of software than of
other works,84 the Third Circuit made its most important contribu-
tion. It proceeded to valuate expert testimony of "whether the most
significant steps of the program are similar."5 The testimony of
plaintiff's expert had focused on "the programs that had the pri-
mary... tasks of the system, and also ones that manipulate files...
programs which actually showed the flow of information, through
the system .... .""
The opinion described "the crucial issue in this case [as] the
similarities and differences in the programs' structures,"8 and re-
viewed the adequacy of the evidence in terms of testimony on five
central subroutines for "invoicing," "day's end," "month-end,"
80. Id.
81. 797 F.2d 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
83. 797 F.2d at 1232-33.
84. Id. at 1245-46.
85. Id. at 1246 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 1246.
87. Id. at 1247 (emphasis in original).
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"accounts receivable" and "order entry." The testimony had been
as to various of these that "they are doing pretty much the same
thing, in the same fields in the same files, and accomplishing pretty
much the same results;"8 8 "[t]he same choices are offered. . . " on
the screen, to "change, skip, cancel;" they "do the same thing in the
same order" (except for "flipping the order" in which two reports
are printed); and that "because the same file structure and the same
program steps are followed, the same overall flow takes place in
both systems."89
One may certainly quibble at the weight given testimony that
both programs used a flag, a character placed in a separate logic
field, to identify to later routines which orders had been invoiced,9"
given that setting a flag in a field or column of a record or table (or
in a memory variable) is a nearly unavoidable journeyman tool of
the programming trade. It was also of debatable wisdom to find
common work of skill or art from testimony that both programs
produced, in not quite the same order, month-end reports for
"product group," "customer sales analysis," "accounts receivable
aging," "AR reports that had to do with service charges," "age file
balance" and "total accounts receivable."91 Few manual or auto-
mated accounting systems could be found which differ from that
pattern.
Nonetheless, Whelan imposed a pragmatic and progressive
framework on issues of the validity and infringement of software
copyrights, within which factual questions presented by programs
of any nature can be treated; and in which the defining balance of
economic interests on which the law impinges can be coherently
addressed.
V. BRODERBUND V UNISON WORLD: THE USER INTERFACE
AND SIMILARITY IN MENUS AND SEQUENCES OF MENUS
Within 60 days of the Third Circuit decision, the quotable
holding of Whelan with respect to the protectability of the struc-
ture, sequence and organization of the logical elements of Form TX
literary copyrights, of which screen output may be indirect evi-
dence, was broadly extended to make similarity in "the structure,
sequencing and arrangement of screens" registered as "audio-vis-
88. Id. at 1247.
89. Id. at 1247-48.
90. Id. at 1247.
91. Id. at 1248.
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ual" works effectively conclusive evidence of infringement. 92
At the same time, Whelan's tests of whether file structures
were so fundamentally dictated by the functions to be performed by
the copyrighted program, and of whether commonly-structured files
were similarly manipulated in the primary subroutines of the re-
spective programs, were combined and then altered into one of
whether "there is no other conceivable way to structure" the "menu
screens and sequence of screens" in a program based on same "un-
derlying ideas."93
Broderbund, like Synercom and Whelan, fits the plagiarism
model, in that it arose out of the introduction of a competitive
software product by a party given full access to the object code of
the infringed product in the course of a terminated venture between
the two authors. Even more than in Whelan, and in contrast to the
other cases involving attempts to appropriate readily-available,
mass-market products by mechanical copying (the Apple and
"PAC-MAN" cases), parallels between the programs were shown
to be due to the conscious, even admitted, translation from one lan-
guage and environment to others hypothesized in Synercom's dic-
tum, but in a context of more problematic reverse engineering.
The formative distinctions of Broderbund, however, were pro-
cedural. First, the plaintiff had wisely learned from Stern Electron-
ics94 and Midway Manufacturing,95 to register its code and screens
separately, respectively as literary and audio-visual works; and had
sued under both, and for trademark infringement and unfair compe-
tition as well. The reported decision revolved only a separate trial
of the severed issue of liability on the audio-visual copyrights. 96
Second, the court's reluctant exclusion of technical testimony, dis-
cussed below, had a perhaps equal impact on the decision.
The registered work was embodied in a program called The
Print Shop, developed to exploit the graphics capabilities of Apple
home computers to allow users to create customized greeting cards,
92. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
93. Id. at 1132.
94. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2nd Cir. 1982).
95. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983), supra note 69. See
also M. Kramer Mfg. Co., 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986) (audio-visual); and Digital Commu-
nications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corporation, 659 F. Supp. 449, 463 (N.D.
Ga. March 31, 1987), (providing protection to "[t]he specific placement, arrangement and
design of the parameter/command terms on the status screen" (main menu) of the Crosstalk
XVI communications program, under registration of a printout of the screen arrangement as
a literary "compilation").
96. Broderbund, 648 F.Supp. at 1129, 1131.
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posters, banners and signs, using bit-mapped type faces and graphic
elements otherwise unavailable.97
Broderbund, exclusive licensee for distribution of the program,
had retained Unison World to attempt to port it to run on other
microcomputers, after Broderbund itself had failed to produce a
version for the IBM Personal Computer. Unison bargained for
rights to an IBM-compatible version, but negotiations failed after
several weeks of attempts to recreate the typefaces of the program
for the very different IBM graphics and PC-DOS environment.
Unison continued its efforts to clone The Print Shop. After ten
months, it brought out its own PC version, which included several
new capabilities, and which, for all the opinion shows, had not
either a single line of code source in common with the predecessor,
or - except as may be implied by what follows - a single segment
of the instructions organized as plaintiff had organized its own.
However, when run by the user, Unison's Printmaster pro-
duced top-end menu screens, ten user interface screens in two func-
tion areas ("Greeting Card" and "Sign"), and additional screen
interface elements for the "Picture Editor" function, all correspond-
ing in appearance to those produced by plaintiff's program.98
The degree of similarity in the screens was intentional. The evi-
dence was that, when the competitive phase of the project began,
Hughes, who had been assigned to the project by Unison during the
negotiations for rights to reproduce plaintiff's program, had reused
the screens he developed toward a perfect reproduction. He had
never, however, had access to plaintiff's source code. Unison had
only been given diskette copies of the program in object code, and
his assignment had been to reverse engineer it, i.e., to independently
devise means for generating the same appearance on the different
hardware.
The opinion does not indicate that Hughes disassembled plain-
tiff's program to do so. There is no technical reason why one would
in order to generate comparable screens; the logic and flow of a
program to create menus and other screen displays is routine and
familiar to any applications programmer. There are indications
that Hughes' screen programming effort had focused on the much
more sophisticated problem of reproducing plaintiff's proportional
type faces and video characteristics on a dissimilar system - on
which plaintiff's work provided no aid.
97. The product had been an exceptional commercial success, selling 500,000 copies at
$49.95. Id. at 1130.
98. Id. at 1131, 1135.
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Moreover, the court felt disabled to consider expert testimony
of such a matter. Although it expressed a preference for the Whe-
lan approach of integrating analytic dissection by experts with lay
evaluation in making findings on similarity,99 it was bound by the
Ninth Circuit's adoption, in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Produc-
tions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., of the Arnstein v. Porter rule1 °1
that the response of an ordinary reasonable person is the test of
intrinsic infringement.10 2
Because only rights in the audiovisual aspects of the work were
tried, the idea/expression dichotomy was approached quite nar-
rowly. Consideration was limited to superficial aspects of the user
interface discernible to the eye when the program ran. Defendant
thus had to argue that the idea which merged with the expression,
to which protection was to be denied under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) and
the authorities previously cited, was the external appearance of
what was displayed to the user.
Defendant ... argues that the idea underlying the menu
screens, input formats, and sequencing or screens in "Print
Shop" is indistinguishable from its expression. Any menu-driven
computer program that allows its users to print greeting cards,
signs, banners, and posters will have a user interface substantially
similar to that in "Print Shop," defendant contends, because
there is no other conceivable way to structure such a program.10 3
The court rejected that sweeping contention by reference to ev-
idence of the Stickybear Printer program from a third party, which
had substantially the same functions, and thus was found to express
the same underlying ideas:
Yet the expressions of those ideas are very different. The menus,
screens, and sequence of screens in the two programs are differ-
ent. The entire structure and organization of the user interfaces
are different. 04
Within the cramped scope of the court's consideration, that
conclusion was unavoidable.
Defendant's fallback position emphasized another copyright
distinction, which will be made critical if consideration of audiovi-
99. Id. at 1136.
100. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977).
101. 154 F.2d 464 (2d. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
102. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1136.
103. Id. at 1132.
104. Id.
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sual copyrights in software may be severed from the underlying lit-
eral program elements, as was attempted here.10 While lesser
aspects of utilitarian literary works are regarded as expressive,
rather than artistic, literary works, and that circumstance led to the
focus in Synercom and Whelan on organization and sequence, the
statutory rule for pictorial and graphic components of utilitarian
works is that
... [T]he design of a useful article shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic or sculptural work if, and only to the extent that such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic or sculptural features that
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing in-
dependently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 106
That defense argument did not prevail on the record in
Broderbund, because Unison had reproduced the screens as nearly
as was feasible, and infringement could be found in purely stylistic
factors such as relative size of typeface entries, selection of non-
functional parallels in phraseology (e.g., "Choose a Font," rather
than "Select . . ."), and arbitrary function names ("Screen
Magic").10 7 In fact, functional matters had been overlooked in the
rush to market: the strongest indication of direct copying was that,
on one screen of the IBM program, the user was still prompted to
press "Return," although the key performing that function is la-
beled "Enter" on the PC keyboard.
It is somewhat difficult to reconcile the court's foregoing con-
stricted statement of what was being protected (which would seem
to allow appropriation of all of the user interface of a popular pro-
gram but the colors, letter sizes, precise prompt phrasing, and mod-
ule names) with other passages in the decision (a) seeming to adopt
the much looser "total concept and feel" of similarity enunciated in
Sid & Marty Krofft,10 8 and Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
105. The very narrow range of protection afforded in Atari, Inc., 672 F.2d 607, made its
manner of giving separate consideration to audiovisual rights much less consequential to ex-
pectations in the industry. That court used standards of comparison for infringement devel-
oped in the pictorial and audiovisual fields, and therefore finally based its finding of
infringement only on appropriation of the most distinctive, almost trademark-like, aspects of
the central game characters, while noting that anything more than slight differences in ap-
pearance and movement would belie the requisite degree of similarity. 672 F. Supp. at 618-
19. Compare the treatment of infringement of the literary copyrights in the same game in
Midway, Inc., supra, note 75, where substantial similarity was treated as something short of
absolute identity in the object code, and was found on the basis of evidence of identity of
between 89% and 97% of the 128,000 units of code (bits in the object code). 564 F. Supp. at
753-754.
106. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
107. 648 F. Supp. at 1134.
108. 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Co.,109 and (b) including factors that were procedural, and only re-
motely aesthetic, among findings of infringement:
The ordinary observer could hardly avoid being struck by
eerie resemblance between the screens of the two programs. In
general, the sequence of screens and the choicespresented... ; and
the method of feedback to the user are all substantially similar.
[.. T]he structures of the "Main Menu" screens; the "stag-
gered" layout of 3-2-3-2-3, totalling thirteen graphics; the "tiled"
layout [offset overlaying of submenus] of 5 X 7 in both pro-
grams; [T]he fact that the "tiled" option disappears ... in me-
dium-sized graphics mode; the use of only left and right arrow
keys ... ; the offering... of only three types of lines... ; and the
fact that both programs require the user to create the front of the
printed product before creating the inside of it.110
If the decision is to be taken as establishing that "the overall
structure, sequencing and arrangement of screens" in the user inter-
face of a program are protected by copyright, or - broader yet -
that a test of the "look and feel" to an ordinary observer is applica-
ble to software cases generally, the profession must anticipate a
good deal of wrestling with the question of what features of a user
interface can be "identified separately from, and are capable of ex-
isting independently of, the utilitarian aspects" of the program.
The sequence in which menus (or command line instructions,
or icons) appear and present their options; the presence or disap-
pearance of some options when others are selected; the number of
capabilities offered (e.g., kinds of typefaces that can be incorporated
in output); the sequence in which modules can be invoked (e.g., in-
side design only after cover design); and the method of feedback to
the user may well reflect fundamental factors in the logic and struc-
ture of a program, determinative of the utilitarian functions it per-
forms, which reach far beyond the merely pictorial or graphic.II
Such factors are undoubtedly reflected in a flow chart of the
functions and procedures of a program, which comes into existence
before screen display coding even commences, and which is itself
explicitly a subject for literary copyrights.
If infringement of audiovisual rights can be found from such
factors, without expert-guided examination of its source and/or ob-
109. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970),
quoted in Broderbund 648 F. Supp. at 1137.
110. 648 F. Supp. at 1137 (emphasis added).
111. But see Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 614, 616, (S.D. N.Y. 1985),
holding "the same [menu] modules would be an inherent part of any [tele]prompting
program."
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ject code, or of its operative logical structure, little remains of Whe-
lan's holding that sensible, external similarities in "screen output
cannot be direct evidence of... infringement" of literary copyrights
in the program itself (and thus, at most, are rebuttable);... or of
Atari's restrictive reading of the protective scope of only audio-vis-
ual copyrights;113 or of Midway's" 4 and Stern's' 5 recognition that
altogether unrelated program instructions can yield identical screen
appearances.
Thus, the true impact of Broderbund as precedent may not be
settled for some time. A flurry of litigation against lookalike pro-
grams comparable to that which followed the reversal in Apple v.
Franklin "6 is to be expected until the questions are settled.
V. POSTSCRIPT ON PLAINS COTTON V GOODPASTURE: FIFTH
CIRCUIT TO FACE ISSUE OF ORGANIZATIONAL COPYING
In a brief but pregnant January 21, 1987 opinion affirming de-
nial of a preliminary injunction against distribution or sale of a pro-
gram for receiving commodity prices and for transmitting and
accounting for commodity trades, allegedly copied from the plain-
tiff's such program, the Fifth Circuit has tentatively rejected We-
lan's "structure and organization" approach and opted for a
potentially very consequential extrapolation from Synercom.
Plains Cotton Cooperative Ass'n, v Goodpasture Computer Serv-
ices, Inc.," 7 is explicitly a procedurally limited decision, sustaining
rulings below, on a premature record, with respect to the prelimi-
nary injunction standards of likelihood of success on the merits and
irreparable harm. It comes in a case, however, which could, if and
as it progresses, present for decision a number of the unresolved
issues identified herein.
Quite apart from the rulings on general software copyright law
discussed below, and although nothing in the opinion indicates
awareness of the distinctiveness of its subject matter, Plains Cotton
is the first appellate decision regarding copyrights in a class of prop-
erty that is rapidly gaining economic importance. We can expect it
to generate further litigation and, probably, a distinctive line of pre-
cedent addressed to its special problems.
112. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244.
113. See note 98.
114. Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 749.
115. Stem Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982).
116. See notes 40, 47, 58.
117. Plains Cotton Coop., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g. denied, February 19,
1987, petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 20, 1987) (No. 86-1868).
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Plains' program operates an on-line public database on the
owner's mainframe computer, made available to subscribers for re-
mote access from their terminals, akin to the Quotron stock market
quotations services and various other real-time videotext systems,' 1 8
but also incorporates an interactive transaction processing system
for accepting and accounting for purchase and/or sales orders from
the subscribers. A system with many of these features is now being
made available on a government subsidized basis to telephone sub-
scribers in France, and is the subject of frantic scrambling for posi-
tion by television cable companies and the Bell Operating
Companies in this country.
As it stands, the Plains Cotton decision constitutes an express
election not to follow Whelan on a partial record in which the copy-
right owner had argued that parallels in the "organizational struc-
ture" of the subject programs sufficed to establish a likelihood of
success on the merits of infringement 11 even if the trial court chose,
as it did, to accept the testimony of the defendants' expert on extrin-
sic similarity (use of access) that there had been no "verbatim, line-
by-line copying."120
Instead, the court of appeals chose, at least while "one step
removed from the actual merits," to adopt Synercom's conclusion
118. Public databases are fee-per-inquiry dial-up services by which a computer user may
obtain information on any covered subject, from an index of periodicals to a table of the
ductility of alloys.
Public bulletin boards are dial-up services by which participants can post and read no-
tices, mail messages, programming and equipment notes, and utilities software. "Plain" vide-
otext software, to display written messages on the subscriber's screen, is not ordinarily
licensed for use, except to the extent of remote access licenses, and is not published, sold or
distributed for use on computers other than the service provider's (although a basic commu-
nications interface module to facilitate dial-up and login may be). It is exploited primarily by
access charges to subscribers, although advertising revenues or sales commissions from third
parties listing goods or services available to subscribers provide an additional means of ex-
ploitation.
Interactive systems, through which subscribers may initiate transactions executed in
whole or in part on the proprietor's computer, may also yield exploitative value in commer-
cial advantage over competitors in the owner's regular line of business, to say nothing of
direct or indirect sales revenues. In Plains Cotton, for example, the proprietor had a contrac-
tual right to a "sold around" charge when subscribers made sales outside the computer chan-
nel.
Bill-paying programs which subscribers address the provider's computer with telephone
number pads, the public database services, such as those in Dialogue and Sharenet, and pub-
lic bulletin-boards, like that of ABANet, share these characteristics to one extent or another.
119. Plains Cotton was briefed and tried before the appellate decision in Whelan. The
plaintiff therefore cast its position in terms of copying "organizational patterns," the phrase
coined in S.A.S. Institute, Inc. v. S&H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 825 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985), rather than in Whelan's "structure, sequence and organization."
120. 807 F.2d at 1262.
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that "organization and configuration of information fed to the com-
puter... were not protected by copyright,"' 2 1 and to extend that
rule very materially by holding, where there was evidence that
"many of the similarities" between the programs were "dictated by
the externalities of the cotton market" in which the programs were
used:
The record supports the inference that market factors play a sig-
nificant role in determining the sequence and organization of cot-
ton marketing software, and we decline to hold that those
patterns cannot constitute 'ideas' in a computer context.
1 22
The double negative in the quoted ruling may reflect reserva-
tion of final judgment on that specific holding, but it does leave as
tentative conclusions (a) that aspects of a program's organization
dictated or determined to a significant extent by market factors are
non-copyrightable, and (b) that a showing of "the reproduction of
the organizational structure of a software system, outlined generally
in the software's design specifications" results in "similarity... on a
level not protected by ... copyright."' 23
A. Screen Formats Dictated by Market Factors As
Uncopyrightable Ideas
The court explained what it meant on point (a) by example:
Footnote 4 notes "[flor example, appellees' witnesses testified that
their cotton marketing program was designed to present the same
information as is contained on a cotton recap sheet, within the con-
fines imposed by use of a computer," whereas plaintiff's expert was
unfamiliar with the cotton marketing industry and thus had no
opinion as to "whether the similarity" between the programs arises
from an attempt to convey the same standardized information to
the user. 124
From the quoted testimony, it is evident that the sequence and
organization which the opinion indicates to have been dictated by
the market was merely the organization of the format in which
transactional data was presented to the user on the screen in one
part of the user interface (both parties had sought to recreate the
appearance of a familiar paper form). Conversely it was not organi-
zation of the logical, operational program structure, in the sense of
121. Id. at 1262 (quoting Synercom Tech. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp.
1003, 1014 (N.D. Tex. 1978)).
122. 807 F.2d at 1262.
123. Id. at 1260.
124. Id. at 1262, n.4.
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the most significant steps of the program, as Midway Manufacturing
was paraphrased in Whelan; or of the "primary ... tasks of the
system... which manipulate files ... [and] actually showed the
flow of information, through the system," as in Jhelan's holding on
the five subroutines. 125
What the court in Plains Cotton was rejecting from Whelan
seems to have been those simplest parts of it which most squarely
took issue with Synercom: those relating to "data structures"
(which the Third Circuit had, with reason, compared to Synercom's
data input formats); and those regarding "screen outputs" (which
came to be the distortingly narrow focus of the opinion in
Broderbund).
B. Functional and Design Specifications As A Level Not
Protected By Copyright
On its conclusion (b), above, the Fifth Circuit in Plains Cotton
confronted a record on which it found:
[Defendants-appellees'] GEMS is very similar to [plaintiff-appel-
lant's] Telcot on the functional specifications, programming, and
documentation levels. In fact, several pages of the GEMS design
manual appear to be direct copies of pages from the design man-
ual appellees created at CXS. The main difference between the
two systems is that Telcot is designed to work on a mainframe
computer, whereas GEMS is designed for a personal
computer. 126
CXS had been a joint venturer with Plains Cotton: the four
programmer defendants had gone to CXS from Plains Cotton's em-
ployment when a departing officer of plaintiff had formed CXS and
caused it to enter into a venture with plaintiff to develop a
microcomputer version of the Telcot mainframe system. During
the venture period, with access to a tape of the Telcot source code,
they had produced a document setting out design specifications for
a micro version, but had done no programming (coding) for it.
They then moved on to Goodpasture, taking along a copy of the
Telcot programming designs (by which the court is understood to
have meant the source code brought from Plains Cotton to CXS).
Within 20 days of their arrival, they had completed a design of a
personal computer version. Some seven or eight months later,
Goodpasture went to market with a rough, incomplete program in-
125. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1246.
126. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1258.
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corporating that design, although the software was not fully opera-
tional by the date of the injunction hearing.
Defendants admitted literal copying of Telcot only to the lim-
ited extent of one subroutine, but that had been replaced and the
responsible programmer discharged before suit, and that appropria-
tion therefore was not part of the request for preliminary relief.
Otherwise, with a possible exception for the screen aping the "Cot-
ton Recap Sheet" in each program, 127 direct copying was not at
issue on the truncated record.
Instead, the partial record came close to presenting, for the
first time, the question of whether flow chart elements, singly or in
the aggregate, can be infringed without literal copying of the regis-
trant's implementing code. 2'
On the record before it, the circuit court clearly felt there was
credible evidence to support findings that "appellant's programs
were too large to have been copied and modified in the ... time it
took to create GEMS;"' 29 that the mainframe Telcot could have
been altered to run on PC's only with changes so "enormous" that
"rewriting the programs would have been faster than modifying
them;" 30 and that similarities at the design level were such as to
have resulted plausibly from the programmers' reliance on " 'just
experience and industry knowledge.' "31 It held, with respect to
corollary issues posed by the count for misappropriation of trade
secrets (in the form of the business procedures embodied in the pro-
gram's functioning), that the terminating employee is entitled to ap-
ply in new employment " 'the experience, knowledge, memory, and
skill, which he... gained while there employed.' ",132
Thus, it viewed the case before it as one in which only the basic
organization of Plains Cotton's program was seriously contended to
have been appropriated; one in which it had not been shown that
anything of that organization was other than what was necessary
for any cotton exchange program; and one in which relief could not
be afforded without depriving the defendant programmers and the
public of the benefit of the very idea of such a program.
The record appears not to have clearly defined what the func-
127. But see the discussions, in connection with Whelan and Broderbund, supra, of
whether similar screen appearances ought to imply similar works of literary authorship.
128. A post-trial record in the case could come closer yet.
129. 807 F.2d at 1260.
130. Id. at 1261.
131. Id. at 1261.
132. Id. at 1263 (quoting Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410,
423 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
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tional and/or design specifications in question contained, 33 or in
what detail their contents were set forth; the opinion certainly does
not do so. From the limited allusions to them, design specifications
appear to have been much more than a RFP (Request for Proposal)
for software - a list of desired functions and capabilities ("func-
tional specifications"): the four programmer defendants had spent a
year at CXS to develop the document of design specifications. 134
Since they had arrived with the complete source for the mainframe
Telcot they had already written for plaintiff, it must be assumed the
CXS document involved some serious and detailed design specific to
the contemplated PC version.
Indeed, their work may have involved the distinctly nontrivial
design of distributed database method used to collect, sort, and pass
around a network of microcomputers, i.e., the transactional data
that Telcot handled in a very different on-line, multi-user main-
frame environment.
Thus, although the cursory, procedurally-oriented opinion
does not make the matter clear, it is probable that defendants took
from the joint venture something akin to a completed flow chart for
a micro cotton exchange program. It is quite clear, on the other
hand, that plaintiff did not purport to own, or to have registered,
anything regarding the venture's works: Plains Cotton had an op-
tion to acquire rights in the CXS product, but was found not to
have exercised it. 135
What was registered, after suit began on other claims, was evi-
dently the source for the mainframe version, and, possibly, the doc-
umentation and specifications for it, to which the court refers as
"the system." '36 Thus, Plains Cotton results in a decision on a full
trial record, or if the question comes before the Supreme Court on
certiorari as an apparent conflict between the Third and Fifth Cir-
cuits (and perhaps the Ninth), a decision could be forced on what
rights inhere in flow charts (or design specifications), as well as on
whether Synercom or Whelan is to be followed.
133. "Design specifications" and "design manual," although commonly used in pro-
gramming, are not terms of art to which a very specific content attaches. In this sense, they
are quite unlike "flow chart." In general usage, such specifications could be expected to
include descriptions of data structures and the relationships among different data structures
(including keys and index definitions), copies of formats for report printouts, and, to extents
varying among jobs, layouts for screen outputs, input screens, and principal menus, They
ordinarily reflect a lesser level of specificity and development than flow charts per se. In
modest jobs, such specifications may suffice, so that the flow chart phase can be omitted.
134. Plains Cotton Cooperative, 807 F.2d at 1258.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1259.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Recent decisions in the Third and Ninth Circuits have pro-
duced greatly enhanced protection for software, and significantly
more sureness as to the rules of lawful competition. Nonetheless,
the tendencies in the two circuits are proceeding toward an una-
voidable collision in two areas: (1) the role and admissibility of ex-
pert testimony in infringement cases; and (2) the degree to which
literary copyrights may be overwhelmed by audiovisual.
The Plains Cotton decision puts the Fifth Circuit at odds with
the Third and Ninth Circuits to a degree that may ultimately re-
quire Supreme Court resolution.
These areas of impending collision pose serious tactical quan-
daries for intellectual property practitioners and the software indus-
try. Undoubtedly, audiovisual registration should be made for any
program with a significant user interface, even where what might
otherwise be considered artistic elements play a much smaller role
in market appeal than is the case among the video games, screen
graphics, and computer-assisted design products which previously
were the constituency for audiovisual copyrights. Literary registra-
tion remains requisite, but a question has been raised as to whether
it extends or restricts the graphic rights.
When infringement is to be asserted, decisions of real practical
importance must be confronted as to whether to bring a single ac-
tion on audiovisual and literary copyrights; whether severance of
the two types of claims will benefit one party or the other; and
whether expert testimony, if admissible in the jurisdiction (on the
literary rights only), may not prove disadvantageous to the plaintiff
who tenders it by negativing the ordinary observer's impression of
superficial similarities. Before Plains Cotton the substantive law
seemed to have been clarified in many respects. Nonetheless, new
areas of ambiguity had been brought forward. A computer pro-
gram is undeniably more utilitarian than any other subject of copy-
right. It therefore poses a uniquely serious tension between the
idea/expression poles which distinguish the content of copyright
and patent grants.
The distinctive aspects of a program's realization of its under-
lying idea, defined in terms of its organization of instructions - in
compiled, machine readable form (independent of source language
or writing style) - have been held protected expression with re-
spect to literary rights in it, over the objection that what is neces-
sary to accomplish a pragmatic purpose cannot be monopolized
under copyright.
1988]
86 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
The quasi-trademark graphic characteristics identifying spe-
cific software to users are protectable expression with respect to au-
diovisual rights in its appearance when displayed on a video
monitor, just as Superman's spit-curl was protected in print media.
Major conceptual and practical difficulties in the idea/expression
categories remain to be resolved, however, where the aesthetic ele-
ments of the program as displayed are integrated with how it func-
tions, i.e., where the structure of the visual elements correspond
non-incidentally with the structure of the underlying program's or-
ganization of the functions it performs, and the means by which it
performs them. The difficulty is greater where the aesthetic ele-
ments arguably derive from patterns in the public domain.
Some serious substantive problems remain unaddressed.
Although one program can be found to be a mere translation of
another into a different language under the Whelan test of basic
organization (perhaps aided by Midway's consideration of compari-
sons of the bits and bytes in the object code), gross dissimilarities in
the appearance of the source notwithstanding, object code compari-
son can be rendered meaningless by a port of the program to an-
other computer architecture (for which the compiled object code
may take on a very different appearance). The cases provide no
clear standards either (a) by which to test whether one program
that looks like another when disassembled, or when abstracted to a
flow chart, but which was coded independently, with no more than
user access to the other, infringes, or (b) on whether disassembled
assembly language or flow charts are admissible.
Finally, there is still no case authority on whether a novel solu-
tion to a problem within the flow of a program, i.e., a novel al-
gorithm, which cannot be confidently said to rise to the dignity of a
patentable idea, can be protected as an element of the programmer's
expression; or whether, instead, a solution of questionable invention
and/or one not patentable as a practical matter because of the lim-
ited hospitability of the Patent Office to software applications, must
go wholly unprotected. The highest art of authorship, and signifi-
cant commercial advantage, may inhere in such a solution, without
its occupying any large proportion of the code, and without its af-
fecting much of the remainder of the program's structure.
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